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This study examined the relationship between analytical rumination and autobiographical memory speciﬁcity in
participants with a history of depression. Participants completed the autobiographical memory test twice, once before and
once after an 8min manipulation designed to increase either an abstract/analytical or concrete/experiential mode of
information processing. Results indicated a signiﬁcant three-way time (pre, post)manipulation (analytical, experi-
ential) depressive rumination (high, low) interaction. This interaction was the result of a signiﬁcant decline in memory
speciﬁcity from pre- to post-manipulation in individuals reporting high levels of rumination about symptoms when
depressed who were allocated to the analytical condition. The ﬁndings of this study extend previous work, suggesting that
low memory speciﬁcity in formerly depressed patients may be a function of state levels of analytical self-focus, with this
cognitive style being more easily reinstated in the recovery phase in those who report a greater trait tendency to ruminate
about symptoms when low in mood.
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A difﬁculty in retrieving speciﬁc autobiographical memories has been repeatedly demonstrated in patients
suffering from depression (e.g. Kuyken & Dalgleish, 1995; Puffet, Jehin-Marchot, Timsit-Berthier, & Timsit,
1991; Moore, Watts, & Williams, 1988; Williams & Scott, 1988). This deﬁcit is of interest because it has been
linked to poor problem-solving skills in depressed and suicidal patients (Evans, Williams, O’Loughlin, &
Howells, 1992; Pollock & Williams, 2001; Sidley, Whitaker, Calam, & Wells, 1997), the persistence of
depressive symptoms in patients diagnosed with major depressive disorders (i.e. Brittlebank, Scott, Williams,
& Ferrier, 1993; Peeters, Wessel, Merckelbach, & Boon-Vermeeren, 2003) and the presence of summer07 Elsevier Ltd.
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Further, there is evidence to suggest that at least in some samples over-general memory persists following
recovery (i.e. Nandrino, Pezard, Poste, Reveillere, & Beaune, 2002; Spinhoven et al., 2006), and may be linked
to a subsequent risk of recurrence of depressive episodes (Mackinger, Loschin, & Leibetseder, 2000;
Mackinger et al., 2003, but see Spinhoven et al., 2006 for a failure to replicate).
A recent review of the research literature on memory speciﬁcity in individuals experiencing emotional
disorder has outlined three interacting mechanisms that appear to contribute to low memory speciﬁcity and its
associated processes (Williams et al., 2007)—deﬁcits in executive capacity, the experience of trauma and
consequent avoidance, and a tendency to become captured by analytical self-focused thinking (e.g. depressive
rumination). The study reported here focuses on this third contributory process—the association between an
analytical mode of information processing and low memory speciﬁcity.
A number of studies have explored the effects of manipulations, which increase or decrease analytical self-
focused thinking on memory speciﬁcity in patients who are depressed or dysphoric. These have demonstrated
that short-term manipulations that reduce analytical thinking temporarily ameliorate low memory speciﬁcity
(e.g. Watkins & Teasdale, 2001, 2004; Watkins, Teasdale, & Williams, 2000), relative to manipulations
that maintain analytical thinking. These studies further suggest that although depressive rumination is
predominantly self-focused, it is not the self-focus per se that leads to low speciﬁcity but rather the mode of
self-focused information processing adopted, whether this rumination is abstract and analytical or concrete
and experiential (e.g. whether individuals abstract from and analyse their experiences or focus directly on these
experiences from moment to moment, Watkins & Teasdale, 2001).
There is clear evidence of low memory speciﬁcity in currently depressed patients, but the ﬁndings for
recovered patients with a history of depression are more mixed. While some studies have identiﬁed persisting
deﬁcits in memory speciﬁcity (i.e. Spinhoven et al., 2006), others have found levels of speciﬁcity more similar
to healthy controls (Crane, Barnhofer, & Williams, 2007; Williams, Barnhofer, Crane, & Beck, 2005). One
possibility is that while executive capacity deﬁcits normalise on recovery, the tendency to engage in analytical
self-focused thinking may continue to contribute to low speciﬁcity, but only in certain contexts or under
certain circumstances. From this perspective, it is assumed that analytical rumination has both state and trait
components. Individuals may differ in the ease with which an analytical mode of processing can be activated
(contributing to their trait tendency towards this form of rumination), but the level of analytical rumination at
any given time (state level) may be dependent on immediate contextual factors. Thus, impaired retrieval of
speciﬁc autobiographical memories may be observed in susceptible recovered depressed participants where the
context encourages increases in analytical thinking.
The aim of this study was to directly examine the effects of increasing or decreasing an analytical mode of
information processing on level of memory speciﬁcity in formerly depressed patients who were currently well.
It was hypothesised that participants who reported engaging in high levels of analytical rumination when
depressed (high trait tendency to ruminate) would show reduced memory speciﬁcity when given an induction
designed to increase levels of analytical thinking (state effect), while those low in rumination allocated to the
analytical condition and those high and low in rumination allocated to an experiential induction would not
show such a decrease.
Method
Participants
Participants were recruited from the community through posters and announcements on a local community
website. Volunteers were recruited who had been depressed in the past but were now well, and those who
expressed an interest were given further information about the study. In total, 34 individuals were deemed
eligible for inclusion. The ﬁnal sample included 11 males and 23 females with a mean age of 31 years (SD ¼ 14
years). The majority of the sample was Caucasian (1 participant was British Asian and 1 Asian) and well
educated, with 71% having participated in higher education.
All participants met criteria for one or more past episode of major depression and all were in recovery at the
time of participation. Thirteen participants (38% of the sample) had experienced suicidal ideation when
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The median number of prior depressive episodes was 3. Eight participants had experienced one
previous episode of depression, six had experienced two, nine had experienced three, one had experienced
four and nine had experienced ﬁve or more episodes (with ﬁve of these people reporting chronic symptoms or
episodes too numerous to count reliably). Six participants (18%) had received inpatient treatment for
depression and six were taking antidepressant medication at the time of participation in the study. Two
participants had current mild social phobia, one current mild OCD, four alcohol dependence or alcohol
dependence in partial remission, one bulimia, one generalised anxiety disorder and two borderline personality
disorder.
Procedure
Participants attended the Department of Psychiatry for two sessions. The ﬁrst comprised a clinical interview
and the completion of several questionnaires. Approximately 1 week later, participants returned to complete
several cognitive tasks (those of relevance to the current study are described below). Participants were
randomly allocated to one of four groups (with AMT word sets, A/B, and type of manipulation, abstract/
experiential, counterbalanced across groups).1 Participants began by completing several practice items on the
autobiographical memory test. Following this, they were presented with the ﬁrst 18 cue words. Participants
were then asked to complete the 8min experiential or analytical attention manipulation (described below). The
experimenter remained in the room with the participant but did not interact with them. Following the
manipulation period, participants completed a second set of 18 AMT cues. Mood was rated on VAS scales
immediately before and after the experimental manipulation. No other tasks were completed between the
manipulation and AMT testing. Participants were fully debriefed and paid £20 for participating in the study.
The study received ethical approval from the University of Oxford, Central University Research Ethics
Committee.
Measures and materials
Clinical interview
Recovery was assessed using an interview based on the NIMH recovery criteria (Keller, Shapiro, Lavori, &
Wolfe, 1982). Recovery was deﬁned as no more than 1 week of minimal symptoms of depression in the past 8
weeks. Participants were also interviewed using the borderline personality disorder module of the Structured
Clinical Interview for DSM (SCID)-II (First, Gibbon, Spitzer, & Williams, 1997), and the Mini International
Neuropsychiatric Interview (MINI; Sheehan et al., 1998) in order to assess the presence of prior major
depression, suicidality, and other current or past axis I disorders. The MINI is a structured interview that
derives DSM-IV diagnoses and has been validated against the SCID-III-R (Sheehan et al., 1998). It has the
advantage of being quicker to administer than the SCID, making it more appropriate for use in experimental
studies. Interviews were conducted by C.C., a post-doctoral research psychologist. Audiotapes of a random
sample of eight interviews were reviewed by an experienced clinical psychologist who was instructed to note
any inconsistencies between the symptoms reported by participants and the decisions reached by the
interviewer. Diagnoses derived by both raters were consistent in all cases.
Attention manipulations (Watkins & Teasdale, 2004)
Participants were randomly allocated to receive a manipulation designed to increase either an analytical
(abstract rumination) or an experiential (concrete rumination; see footnote 1) mode of information processing.
In both cases, participants were asked to read through a series of 28 cards that contained identical self-relevant1AMT word set order (A/B or B/A) and experimental manipulation (analytical or experiential) were counterbalanced across participants
such that participants could be allocated to one of four groups. At the start of the experiment, the ﬁnal number of participants to be
recruited was unknown. Therefore, randomisation was blocked such that within each group of four participants recruited one would be
allocated to each experimental condition. Randomisation envelopes were prepared and a member of the research team blind to clinical
information randomised each participant following the clinical interview.
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hopeless you are feeling’’, ‘‘your present feelings of fatigue or energy’’), preceded by one of two introductions.
In the analytical condition, participants were asked to ‘‘think about’’ the topic in the statement (e.g. ‘‘Think
about your present feelings of fatigue or energy’’). This was preceded by the instruction ‘‘as you read these
items use your imagination and concentration to think about the causes, meanings, and consequences of the
items’’. In the experiential condition participants were asked to ‘‘focus your attention on your experience of’’
the topic in the statement (e.g. ‘‘focus your attention on your present feelings of fatigue or energy’’). This was
preceded by the instruction ‘‘as you read the items, use your imagination and concentration to focus your
mind on each experience. Spend a few moments visualising and concentrating on your experience, attempting
to ﬁnd a phrase, image or set of words that best describes the quality of what you sense’’. Thus, the
experiential instructions encouraged participants to focus on direct experiences, while the analytical
instructions encouraged participants to abstract from and analyse the experiences. Two previous studies have
demonstrated that both manipulations leave the state of mood unaffected (Watkins & Moulds, 2005; Watkins
& Teasdale, 2004), and both produce increases in self-focus (Watkins & Moulds, 2005) or result in equivalent
levels of post-manipulation self-focus (Watkins & Teasdale, 2004). Further, in currently depressed individuals,
the experiential manipulation improves interpersonal problem solving and reduces over-general autobio-
graphical memory relative to analytical manipulation (Watkins & Moulds, 2005; Watkins & Teasdale, 2004).
Autobiographical memory test (Williams and Broadbent, 1986)
Participants were presented with 2 sets of 18 cue words (1 pre- and 1 post-manipulation, 9 positive and
9 negative trait adjectives in each set). The word sets were matched for frequency, emotionality and
imageability using data from the University of Western Australia Psycholinguistic Database. The words in set
A were strong, lazy, untidy, interesting, stupid, reliable, boring, poor, kind, calm, failure, sad, responsible,
anxious, optimistic, fat, confident and happy. The words in set B were friendly, energetic, angry, humorous,
loving, mean, rich, lonely, pessimistic, carefree, selfish, tidy, jealous, independent, aggressive, weak,
understanding and bitter. Participants were instructed to recall a speciﬁc memory in response to each cue
word. ‘Speciﬁc’ was deﬁned as a memory of an event that occurred at a particular time and place and lasted no
longer than 1 day. Participants were also instructed not to repeat memories or to describe memories of events
occurring in the last 12 months. Examples were given and participants completed 3 practice items. In the test
phase participants were given 30 s per cue.
All responses were audio-taped and scored for level of speciﬁcity by the experimenter as speciﬁc (4),
extended (3), categoric (2), semantic associations (1) or omissions (0). A second rater, blind to all other details
of the experiment, rated a sample of 235 memory responses. The weighted k based on scoring of memories
(4-3-2-1-0 as above) indicated excellent agreement, k ¼ 0.82. Previous research (e.g. Crane et al., 2007) has
indicated that in formerly depressed community samples there may be relatively low rates of different types of
non-speciﬁc memory, precluding analyses of different types of error (e.g. number or proportion of categoric
memories). We therefore followed Williams et al. (2006) and used total speciﬁcity scores (summed scores
where speciﬁc memories are assigned a score of 4, extended memories a score of 3, categoric memories a score
of 2, associates a score of 1 and omissions a score of 0), pre- and post-manipulation, as the main outcome
measures in the analyses. These scores are based on the assumption, derived from hierarchical models of
memory retrieval (such as the Self-Memory System model of Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), that memory
responses of different types differ systematically in the level of speciﬁcity from speciﬁc memories at the top to
semantic associates and then omissions as the least speciﬁc type of response. While this represents an
approximation, it enables information on different classes of memory error to be incorporated into the
dependent variable in samples where absolute levels of each type of error are small. This measure was used to
improve sensitivity to changes in the level of memory speciﬁcity, but we also report (in footnote 3) comparable
results for analyses based on number of speciﬁc memories retrieved.
Response-style questionnaire—Ruminative Responses Scale (Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003).
This questionnaire contains three sub-scales assessing different aspects of rumination—depression-related
rumination (analytical rumination focused on the symptoms of depression, 12 items, e.g. ‘‘think about feelings
of achiness and fatigue’’, ‘‘think about how hard it is to concentrate’’), brooding (described by the authors as
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neutrally valenced pondering, e.g. ‘‘analyse recent events to try and understand why you are depressed’’).
Since items ask participants how often they think about and analyse different experiences, the ruminative
responses scale (RRS), broadly speaking, assesses levels of analytical rumination. Some studies have focused
on the total RRS score as a measure of depressive rumination while others have favoured speciﬁc sub-scales.
For the purposes of the present study, we were most interested in the depressive rumination sub-scale of this
questionnaire because the items used in the manipulations of analytical and experiential thinking (e.g. Watkins
& Teasdale, 2004) are based on the content of this sub-scale. Hence, it was assumed that priming and
reinstatement of analytical rumination by manipulation would be most likely to occur in those in whom this
symptom-focused depressive rumination had been a habitual tendency during past depressive episodes.
Previous research has suggested that the depressive rumination sub-scale may be confounded with severity
of depression (e.g. Treynor et al., 2003). However, in the current sample there was no signiﬁcant correlation
between endorsement of items on the depressive rumination sub-scale items and (a) number of depressive
symptoms reported during the worst episode of major depression, rs ¼ 0.09, p40.60, (b) current level of
depression as assessed by the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI), rs ¼ 0.12, p ¼ 0.50, or (c) number of prior
depressive episodes, rs ¼ 0.18, p ¼ 0.32. Although this increases conﬁdence that the depressive rumination
measure was independent of severity of depression participants had experienced, for comparability with other
studies the analyses were repeated using the total RRS scale and are reported in footnote 4.
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II, Beck, Steer and Brown, 1996)
The BDI-II is a well-established measure of depressive symptomatology. It contains 21 groups of
statements, which assess the severity of symptoms of depression over the preceding 2 weeks.
Current mood ratings
To ensure that any effects of the manipulations of mode of processing were not simply a consequence of
changes in mood, participants completed visual analogue scales to rate levels of happiness and despondency
prior to and following the manipulation. Two 10 cm scales were presented to participants, each labelled from
‘not at all’ sad/happy to ‘extremely’ sad/happy. Participants were asked to make a mark on each scale to
indicate their mood ‘at this moment’.
Results
Statistics
An a level of 0.05 was used for all statistical tests. Analysis was conducted using SPSS version 14.2
Participants
In total, 16 participants were allocated to the analytical and 18 to the experiential manipulations, with 5
males in the analytical and 6 in the experiential condition. One of the male participants (who was allocated to
the analytical condition) was identiﬁed as a statistical outlier on the pre-manipulation memory speciﬁcity score
and was excluded from further analysis as he retrieved only one speciﬁc memory and it was unclear whether he
had understood the task instructions. Mean levels of depressive rumination were somewhat higher in women
than in men but there was no signiﬁcant difference between groups, F (1, 31) ¼ 1.12, p ¼ 0.30. Two
Spearman’s rank order correlations were computed to explore the association between number of prior
depressive episodes (1, 2, 3, 4, 5+) and speciﬁcity of memory (pre- and post-manipulation). These indicated no
signiﬁcant associations (memory speciﬁcity score: pre, rs ¼ 0.15, p ¼ 0.40; post, rs ¼ 0.10, p ¼ 0.56). There
was also no signiﬁcant effect of gender on pre- or post-manipulation speciﬁcity scores and no signiﬁcant main2The memory speciﬁcity scores at pre- and post-test had mild negative skewness. However, when the main analyses were repeated with
the memory speciﬁcity scores root transformed (to normalise the data) this yielded materially equivalent results, and for clarity the
analyses on the untransformed data are reported.
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post: M ¼ 56.90, SD ¼ 15.37; females: pre: M ¼ 61.17, SD ¼ 8.22, post: M ¼ 61.21, SD ¼ 8.52). Analyses
were therefore collapsed across gender.
Current mood
All participants were in recovery from depression, reporting no more than 1 week of minimal symptoms of
depression in the preceding 8 weeks. The mean BDI-II score of the sample was low at M ¼ 3.73 (SD ¼ 3.97).
Of the 33 participants, 32 reported no more than minimal symptoms of depression on the BDI-II (BDI-II
score o13) and one participant scored in the mild symptoms range (14–19). There was no signiﬁcant
difference in BDI-II score between participants allocated to the analytical and experiential rumination
conditions, U ¼ 133.50, Z ¼ 0.37, p ¼ 0.71.
Effect of manipulations on mood
VAS happiness and despondency ratings were taken immediately pre and post the analytical and
experiential manipulations (happiness: analytical pre: M ¼ 5.55, SD ¼ 1.73, post: M ¼ 5.48, SD ¼ 2.01;
experiential pre: M ¼ 5.11, SD ¼ 1.84, post: M ¼ 5.41, SD ¼ 1.23; despondency: analytical pre: M ¼ 2.75,
SD ¼ 1.77, post: M ¼ 2.92, SD ¼ 2.11; experiential pre: M ¼ 2.67, SD ¼ 1.83, post: M ¼ 2.97, SD ¼ 1.87).
Separate 2 (time: pre, post) by 2 (manipulation: analytical, experiential) mixed ANOVAs were computed to
examine the effects of the manipulations on mood. These identiﬁed no signiﬁcant main effects, or
timemanipulation interactions (all F’so1), conﬁrming that the two manipulations had minimal and
equivalent effects on participants’ mood state.
Autobiographical memory
The mean speciﬁcity score for participants in each condition and the descriptive statistics for participants’
responses to the AMT are shown in Table 1. The majority of participants’ responses were speciﬁc and where
participants did not give a speciﬁc response their errors fell relatively equally across the different ‘error’
categories, with very low mean numbers of memory response in each category, precluding analysis of different
types of error.
Effects of manipulations on memory specificity
We divided the sample into two groups based on a median split on the depressive rumination sub-scale of
the RSS (low depressive rumination, n ¼ 17; high depressive rumination, n ¼ 16). A 2 (time; pre-test, post-test)
by 2 (manipulation; analytical, experiential) by 2 (rumination: high, low) mixed ANOVA was conducted to
examine the effects of the manipulation and level of rumination on memory speciﬁcity. This analysis revealedTable 1
Descriptive data for memory responses given by participants allocated to the analytical and experiential conditions, pre and post the
manipulation of thinking style
Type of memory Analytical Experiential
Pre Post Pre Post
Speciﬁc 13.13 (4.60) 12.69 (5.26) 13.06 (3.50) 12.78 (4.45)
Extended 1.06 (1.57) 1.25 (1.61) 1.44 (1.62) 1.50 (1.54)
Categoric 1.38 (1.75) 1.50 (2.37) 1.17 (1.65) 1.22 (1.77)
Semantic associate 0.69 (1.54) 1.19 (2.23) 0.28 (0.57) 0.50 (0.86)
Omission 1.69 (1.58) 1.38 (1.78) 2.06 (2.46) 2.00 (2.63)
Total speciﬁcity score 62.13 (7.51) 61.53 (8.13) 59.17 (10.26) 58.56 (12.68)
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Analytical
Rumination
High Low
M
e
a
n
 S
p
e
c
if
ic
it
y
 S
c
o
re
56
58
60
62
64
M
e
a
n
 S
p
e
c
if
ic
it
y
 S
c
o
re
56
58
60
62
64
Experiential
Rumination
High Low
Pre Post
Fig. 1. Effects of manipulations to increase analytical and experiential rumination on autobiographical memory speciﬁcity in formerly
depressed participants reporting high and low levels of rumination when depressed.
C. Crane et al. / Behaviour Research and Therapy 45 (2007) 3077–3087 3083no signiﬁcant main effects of time or manipulation, and no signiﬁcant two-way interactions. However, there
was a signiﬁcant three-way timemanipulation depressive rumination interaction, F (1, 29) ¼ 7.23,
p ¼ 0.012, Zp2 ¼ 0.20.
Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc comparisons were conducted to explore the origins of this three-way
interaction. First, speciﬁcity scores were compared between those allocated to the analytical and experiential
rumination conditions, at both pre-test and post-test, separately for those high and low in rumination. There
were no signiﬁcant effects (all p’s40.39). Second, speciﬁcity scores were compared between participants high
and low in rumination, at both pre-test and post-test, separately for those allocated to the analytical and
experiential manipulations. Again there were no signiﬁcant effects (all p’s40.2). Finally, changes in memory
speciﬁcity from pre-test to post-test were examined separately for those high and low in rumination, allocated
to the analytical and experiential manipulation conditions. These analyses indicated a signiﬁcant reduction in
memory speciﬁcity score from pre-test to post-test among those allocated to the analytical rumination
condition who were high in depressive rumination, Mij ¼ 5.50, SE ¼ 2.23, p ¼ 0.025. There were no other
signiﬁcant effects (all p’s40.30).3,4 The effects of the manipulations on memory speciﬁcity in high and low
ruminators are shown in Fig. 1.
Discussion
Overview
This study explored the effects of manipulations designed to increase or decrease state levels of analytical
self-focused thinking on autobiographical memory speciﬁcity in a recovered depressed sample. The results of3These analyses were repeated using the number of speciﬁc memories retrieved, rather than the total speciﬁcity score, as the dependent
variable. The signiﬁcant three-way time rumination groupmanipulation interaction remained, F (1, 29) ¼ 5.89, p ¼ 0.02. Post-hoc tests
again indicated a signiﬁcant reduction in number of speciﬁc memories retrieved from pre- to post-induction in high ruminators allocated to
the analytical manipulation, Mij ¼ 0.22, SE ¼ 1.06, p ¼ 0.05. There were no other signiﬁcant main effects or interactions, and no other
signiﬁcant post-hoc comparisons.
4These analyses were also repeated dividing the sample into two groups on the basis of a median split on the total RRS score
(low rumination ¼ 18, high rumination ¼ 15). Again there was a signiﬁcant time rumination groupmanipulation interaction,
F (1, 29) ¼ 4.75, p ¼ 0.04, and a signiﬁcant reduction in speciﬁcity in the high ruminators allocated to the analytical manipulation from
pre- to post-manipulation, Mij ¼ 5.50, SE ¼ 2.37, p ¼ 0.03. There were no other signiﬁcant main effects or interactions, and no other
signiﬁcant post-hoc comparisons.
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memory speciﬁcity, but only in those previously depressed individuals who reported high trait tendencies
towards depressive rumination.
A recent review of the literature on low memory speciﬁcity and emotional disorder has suggested that three
processes—analytical rumination (and capture by self-discrepancies), deﬁcits in executive capacity and
functional avoidance—are likely to contribute to the phenomenon in depressed samples (Williams et al., 2007).
It is suggested that for some individuals reduced memory speciﬁcity develops initially to serve an affect
regulation function, reducing the negative affect that would otherwise occur in response to the retrieval of
speciﬁc distressing mental content. However, although reduced speciﬁcity may be negatively reinforced as a
result, like other safety behaviours, it has signiﬁcant deleterious consequences for the individual (e.g. impairing
interpersonal problem solving and reciprocally reinforcing and being reinforced by ruminative tendencies),
which ultimately increase the likelihood of persistent depression (see Williams et al., 2007 for further
discussion). It is therefore of interest to understand more about the processes that maintain low memory
speciﬁcity during depression and those that may encourage it to persist or re-emerge in the recovery phase.
While low speciﬁcity is a robust observation in currently depressed samples, the relative contribution of
executive capacity deﬁcits, functional avoidance and rumination to the phenomenon is likely to differ from
person to person. Not all individuals who are depressed engage in high levels of rumination and not all have
experienced traumatic events. Since deﬁcits in executive capacity remit on recovery from depression the
relative importance of rumination and functional avoidance in contributing to low speciﬁcity in participants
who have recovered from depression is likely to be greater. This study suggests that state factors that
promote an analytical mode of information processing may lead to reduced memory speciﬁcity in the recovery
phase in a sub-set of formerly depressed patients—those who have high trait tendencies towards analytical
rumination and in whom speciﬁc contextual factors are therefore able to reinstate this habitual processing
style. Low memory speciﬁcity in the recovery phase may be less observable in those patients in whom
lack of speciﬁcity during depressive episodes is primarily attributable to deﬁcits in executive capacity and
control and may be elicited by different factors in those for whom functional avoidance is the key contributory
process.
Previous studies have differed in the extent to which low memory speciﬁcity has been observed in formerly
depressed patients. The ﬁndings of this study suggest that one possibility is that studies have also differed in
the extent to which the testing situation has had the capacity to increase state levels of analytical thinking. For
example, studies that test memory speciﬁcity immediately after a detailed clinical interview or in the hospital
where the individual received treatment for depression may be more likely to reinstate rumination and reduce
memory speciﬁcity than studies that do not include these elements. Additionally, different studies may have
tended to sample from sub-populations of formerly depressed patients differing in trait ruminative tendencies.
Community studies requiring a sustained period of recovery following a depressive episode may be less
likely to include high ruminators since rumination increases the severity of depressive symptoms and is
related to the emergence of depressive symptoms in response to stressful events (e.g. Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000;
Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). In contrast, studies that follow up clinic samples into the recovery phase
will be less open to this bias. Finally, the cue words themselves may activate an analytical mode if they map
onto themes that have been the subject of depressive rumination in the past (e.g. Crane et al., 2007) reducing
levels of memory speciﬁcity observed.
Limitations
Although the ﬁndings of this study are consistent with theoretical predictions, there are a number of
limitations that require consideration. Most importantly, the study utilised a relatively small sample, which
might have increased likelihood of type-2 errors, and the ﬁndings should therefore be considered with caution
until there is evidence of replication.
Second, the analyses focused on the moderating effect of trait levels of depressive rumination on memory
speciﬁcity. Levels of depressive rumination were explored since it is this type of analytical rumination that
maps most closely on to the content of the manipulations of processing style. However, other researchers have
suggested that brooding is the most pernicious form of rumination and that measures of depressive rumination
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current sample, we found no signiﬁcant association between levels of depressive rumination and number of
symptoms of depression during the most severe depressive episode, number of depressive episodes or current
BDI score. Further, the same results held when the sample was subdivided using a median split on the total
RRS score, increasing conﬁdence that the ﬁndings are not simply attributable to comparisons between more
and less severely affected participants. However, the focus of the current study was on the priming of a mode
of information processing (whether analytical or experiential), the capacity to do this in different participant
groups and the down-stream consequences of this for memory speciﬁcity, rather than on the effects of the
particular content to be processed within this mode. It may therefore be interesting in future research to
explore whether trait tendencies towards different types of rumination (for example, brooding versus
reﬂection) are more closely related to low memory speciﬁcity during depressive episodes or to the reactivation
of low speciﬁcity in certain contexts following recovery.
Third, in this study participants were requested to retrieve memories of events that had occurred more than
12 months ago. This instruction was included because an additional aim of the current study was to explore
biases in the sampling of memories from across the lifespan. However, introducing this restriction may
have increased the difﬁculty of the task faced by participants and may have acted as a cognitive load.
Although instructions were constant across experimental conditions it is possible that the effect of the
manipulations on memory speciﬁcity may have been more pronounced as a result. Such an effect might arise if
participants had less cognitive resources available to override the effects of the manipulations, as a result of the
extra demand placed on executive capacity. Although we believe that this is unlikely to be a signiﬁcant factor
in the results, work is beginning to explore the effects of cognitive load on memory speciﬁcity in recovered
depressed samples and this is an interesting line of future research (e.g. Barnhofer, Crane, Spinhoven, &
Williams, in press).
Finally, previous studies have demonstrated that analytical and experiential manipulations have equivalent
effects on self-focus, leaving mood state unchanged (e.g. Watkins & Teasdale, 2004; Watkins & Moulds, 2005)
and the current study also ruled out changes in mood as a possible factor in the results. One previous
study (Watkins & Moulds, 2005) has also examined the extent to which the manipulations affected the
abstractness of participants’ responses to the task of interest (using the judgments of an independent rater) as a
further manipulation check. Since ratings of memory speciﬁcity are very close to ratings of memory
abstractness, in the current study we explored the effects of the manipulations on this variable directly,
without the inclusion of a further manipulation check. However, it would clearly be beneﬁcial in future
research to develop a task that could be used to independently and indirectly assess the effects of these
manipulations on mode of processing, since the effects are likely to be subtle and not necessarily available to
self-report.
Conclusions
Previous research has indicated that analytical self-focused thinking contributes to the maintenance of
low memory speciﬁcity in currently dysphoric individuals (Watkins & Teasdale, 2001, 2004). This study
demonstrates that such a thinking style also appears to reduce levels of memory speciﬁcity in individuals who
are in recovery and asymptomatic, but that this effect occurs only in those for whom analytical rumination
about symptoms of depression is a more habitual pattern. These ﬁndings are of relevance with regard to the
question of why low memory speciﬁcity is a more inconsistent feature in previously depressed individuals
and they illustrate potential ways in which effects of analytical thinking may cascade into further vulnerability
processes increasing the risk for relapse. These ﬁndings are also interesting from a clinical perspective.
Previous research has suggested that an intervention (mindfulness-based cognitive therapy, MBCT) that
aims to reduce the risk for depressive relapse in part by increasing patients’ capacity to disengage
from analytical rumination, also increases memory speciﬁcity (e.g. Williams, Segal, Teasdale, & Soulsby,
2000). The ﬁndings of the current study support the suggestion that the reduction of habitual tendencies to
ruminate may represent one plausible mechanism of action of MBCT on memory speciﬁcity and suggest that
modifying trait tendencies to ruminate may have important consequences for other aspects of psychological
functioning.
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